North Korea vs. South Korea
1953 - ongoing by 2011
Core issue: Ideological differences between the two countries and
the ambition of Korean peninsula unification under one ideology
Type of conflict ending: Conflict ongoing by 2011
The conflict on the Korean Peninsula is rooted in the historical experiences of the Korean people after the Second World War. The end of WWII left Korea divided into two halves with the southern part occupied by the U.S. forces and the northern half by the Soviet Union. The artificial border was created at the 38th parallel. The two parts of Korea soon got into a conflict, which driven by an ideological issue. The government in the North, headed by Kim Il-Sung followed communist ideology and was supported by the Soviet Union and communist China. The government in the South was a capitalist right-wing authoritarian regime and supported by the United States. Both Koreas sought to reunify the Korean Peninsula under their own political systems, which resulted in violence on June 25, 1950, when the North invaded the South.
The war was ended by the Korean Armistice agreement in 1953, a ceasefire that stopped the war but did not create peace between the two governments or resolve the core issue over the control of the Korean Peninsula. The Armistice was initially opposed by both sides as South Korean president Syngman Rhee argued for continued advances across the 38th parallel to expel communist forces out of the Korean Peninsula. The opposite perception was held by Kim Il-Sung, but the lack of support from their allies meant that the two Korean armies would not have the capabilities to continue fighting.
The Armistice Treaty was signed by leaders of the Korean People’s Army, the Chinese People’s Volunteer Army, and by the United Nations Command. Syngman Rhee refused to sign on behalf of South Korea. The treaty was nevertheless implemented and included the creation of a demilitarized zone. There were small instances of violence during the Cold War between South and North Korea, but the treaty was largely complied with, and large-scale violence was not renewed. The lack of violence did not mean that the war was over as both sides maintained militarized borders and diplomatic contact between the two governments was rare.
The Sunshine Policy created by the Kim Dae-jung government of South Korea and supported by the Clinton administration in the United States was the most ambitious initiative towards normalizing relationships between the two countries. From 1998, the policy was implemented to foster good will between the two Koreas. The late 1990s were a period of economic growth for South Korea but economic decline for North Korea. The North had been investing heavily into its military and nuclear programs thus its economy and people were suffering as a result. The focus of the Sunshine Policy was to convince the North that the South did not constitute a threat and advocated for economic exchange. In June 2000, leaders from the two countries (Kim Dae-Jung and Kim Jong-Il) met for the first time since the Korean War. Although this was a major step in North-South relations, it did not lead to any binding agreements between the two states.
The policy failed to engender a more amicable relationship and North Korea continued to invest resources in its nuclear arsenal. In 2006, and in the following year, North Korea tested nuclear weapons to deter any unwilling intervention, thereby demonstrating that the conflict was still not resolved. By 2011, the core issue that divided both Koreas was not resolved and violent escalation remained a possibility.
Sources
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John Delury, Chung-in Moon, and Sue Mi Terry, 2014. “A Reunified Theory: Should We Welcome the Collapse of North Korea?”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 93, 179.
Noland, M., 1997. “Why North Korea Will Muddle Through”, Foreign Affairs, 76, 105.
Radzinsky, B., 2018. Nuclear Risks in Northeast Asia: Opportunities and Challenges for Extended Deterrence and Assurance”, Journal for Peace and Nuclear Disarmament, Vol. 1, 363–382.
Seung-Yeol Lee, 2017. “Political Transition in North Korea in the Kim Jong-un Era: Elites’ Policy Choices”, Asian Perspective, Vol. 41, 431.
Yonhap News Agency, 2009. “Chronology of major North Korean statements on the Korean War armistice”, [online]. Yonhap News Agency. Available from: https://en.yna.co.kr/view/AEN20090528004200315 [Accessed 24 Aug 2019].