United States of America vs. Iraq

1991 - 2003

Core issue: Territorial aggression of Iraq as well as its intrastate
behavior led to an upsetting of the balance of the power in the region.

Type of conflict ending: Violent thawing

The frozen conflict between the United States and Iraq can be traced to Saddam Hussein's invasion of his oil-rich neighbor Kuwait in 1990. Several factors determined the relationship between Iraq and Kuwait. Both countries previously had territorial disputes dating back to the 1940s and 1950s. Further, Saddam was heavily indebted to Arab lenders from the Gulf States, and it further accused Kuwait of slant-drilling in the Rumaila oil-field on the border between the two countries. After the invasion of Kuwait, the US formed a "coalition of the willing" to counter Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in an attempt to protect the balance of power in the region. Since the end of the war in 1991, a frozen conflict between the US and Iraq ensued, with occasional outbursts of violence.

After the invasion, Iraq withdrew from Kuwait in spring of 1991 and agreed to UN requirements concerning WMD stockpiles and granted access to inspectors ensure compliance. However, in several instances Iraqi authorities precipitated crises when inspectors were denied access to suspected weapons production facilities. Throughout the 1990s, the US continued to perceive Iraq as a threat to regional stability for its refusal to cooperate with the UN. After the war of 1991, Saddam's regime quelled Kurdish rebel movements in the northern part of the country and Shi'ite insurgents in the south with brutal repression.  In response, the allied coalition enforced a no-fly zone over the north, and later south of Iraq. The use of chemical and biological weapons by Iraq, military buildups and provocations on the Kuwaiti border, and the potential for Saddam to create instability and spillover in the Middle East that could disrupt vital oil resources were the principal reasons behind the antagonism between the US and Iraq. These issues led to several military actions by the US in partnership with the UK, with bombing campaigns against Iraqi intelligence, military infrastructure, and anti-aircraft systems in 1993, 1996, 1998, and 2001.

In the context of post-9/11 US policy, US President George W. Bush characterized Iraq as a member of the "Axis of Evil". In 2002, after major operations against the Taliban in Afghanistan had concluded, the Bush administration began pushing for military action to remove Saddam Hussein from power. The administration made intelligence public which indicated that Iraq was still in possession of WMDs and the US further accused Iraq of not granting sufficient access to UN weapons inspectors. The United States also began to connect Iraq to the "War on Terror" by asserting that Iraq's regime had supported al-Qaeda. In consequence, the United States, along with a coalition of the UK, Australia, and Poland, invaded and deposed Saddam Hussein's regime in March of 2003. Saddam was captured later that year and executed in 2006. The conflict changed in nature and continued as Sunni insurgents resorted to attacks against the US coalition and Shi'ite communities. Iraq was not anymore perceived as a threat to regional stability by the United States which was confronted with different security challenges in Iraq than during the period after the First Gulf War in 1991. Hence, the conflict resolution process can thus be characterized as violent thawing.

Sources

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